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a whole. Yet skeptics (including 
some security professionals) ar-
gue that short-term expenditures 
on such “nonessential” items as 
analy sis should be curtailed, and 
that the results of any analyses 
should be kept secret. The return 
on investment in security isn’t vis-
ible in the short term, and, there-
fore, detractors feel empowered to 
ignore the well-known long-term 
costs of vulnerability, which in-
clude negative effects on the value 
of intangible assets and goodwill. 
They argue that investment in se-
curity is squandering corporate as-
sets that could be better utilized to 
generate strong short-run returns 
for shareholders. 
Unfortunately, corporate in-
formation security skeptics cur-
rently have a firm hold inside 
many enterprises. In particular, 
empirical data indicates that com-
panies aren’t successfully antici-
pating and managing information 
risk. For example, in the 2008 
PricewaterhouseCoopers annual 
information security survey of 
more than 7,000 respondents—
comprising CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, 
CSOs, vice presidents, and direc-
tors of IT and information secu-
rity from 119 countries—at least 
three of 10 respondents couldn’t 
answer basic questions about their 
organizations’ information secu-
rity practices. Thirty-five percent 
didn’t know how many security 
incidents occurred in the past 
year; 44 percent didn’t know what 
types of security incidents present-
ed the greatest threats to the com-
pany; 42 percent couldn’t identify 
the source of security incidents; 
and, finally, 67 percent said their 
of vulnerability research and who 
counts as a “vulnerability research-
er” is a subject of debate in the 
academic and business communi-
ties.  For purposes of this article, 
we presume that vulnerability 
researchers are driven by a desire 
to prevent information security 
harms and engage in responsible 
disclosure upon discovery of a se-
curity vulnerability.) Yet provided 
that these researchers and practi-
tioners do not themselves engage 
in conduct that causes harm, their 
conduct doesn’t necessarily run 
afoul of ethical and legal consid-
erations. We advocate crafting a 
code of conduct for vulnerabil-
ity researchers and practitioners, 
including the implementation of 
procedural safeguards to ensure 
minimization of harm. 
Why Vulnerability 
Research Matters
The computer and network tech-
nologies that we’ve come to de-
pend on in every part of our life 
are imperfect. During the past de-
cade, the practice of finding and 
exploiting such imperfections has 
matured into a highly lucrative 
industry. To combat this escalat-
ing threat, security researchers 
find themselves in a perpetual race 
to identify and eliminate vulner-
abilities before attackers can ex-
ploit them and to educate and train 
practitioners to test for known vul-
nerabilities in deployed systems. 
While nefarious parties operate in 
secrecy without fear of law, ethics, 
or public scrutiny, legitimate secu-
rity researchers operate in the open 
and are subject to these constraints. 
Hence, researchers are sometimes 
hesitant to explore important in-
formation security issues owing to 
concern about their ethical and le-
gal implications.
Provided that vulnerability re-
search is done ethically, research-
ers perform an important social 
function: they provide informa-
tion that closes the information 
gap between the creators, opera-
tors, or exploiters of vulnerable 
products and the third parties who 
will likely be harmed because of 
them. A culture war is currently 
under way in the cybersecurity in-
dustry and research communities 
regarding the value of investment 
in vulnerability analysis of prod-
ucts and operations. On one hand, 
many data security champions ar-
gue that maintaining best practic-
es in information security, which 
includes diligent analysis of prod-
ucts for vulnerabilities and flaws, 
is “the right thing to do” both for 
the system operator and society as 
D
ebate has arisen in the scholarly community, 
as well as among policymakers and business 
entities, regarding the role of vulnerability 
researchers and security practitioners as sen-





organization didn’t audit or moni-
tor compliance with the corporate 
information security policy —
whether the attack was most likely 
to have originated from employees 
(either current or former), custom-
ers, partners or suppliers, hackers, 
or others. According to this annual 
longitudinal research, many com-
pany leaders lack a well-rounded 
view of their information security 
compliance activities: “business 
and IT executives may not have a 
full picture of compliance lapses ... 
Fewer than half of all respondents 
say their organization audits and 
monitors user compliance with 
security policies (43 percent)” and 





_new_currency.pdf). Rampant data 
breaches of millions of records 
in 2009 further speak for them-
selves, demonstrating widespread 
inadequacies in corporate infor-
mation handling (www.privacy 
rights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.
htm). Meanwhile, each of those 
breached records is attached to a 
company or a consumer potential-
ly harmed by the disclosure. 
It’s undisputable that lax in-
formation security and vulnerable 
products erode commercial trust 
and impose costs on third par-
ties—business partners, sharehold-
ers, consumers, and the economic 
system as a whole. The reason for 
this arises from the nature of in-
formation risk: its impact is in-
herently transitive. This means 
that if a company fails to secure 
another company’s information, 
the negative effects to the shared 
data are similar to those that 
would have occurred if the origi-
nal company had been breached 
itself (for example, banks affected 
by data breaches have argued that 
they can’t continue to absorb the 
downstream costs of other com-
panies’ information security mis-
takes1). In practice, this means that 
negative financial externalities are 
imposed on individuals and com-
panies not responsible for the data 
loss. Furthermore, information 
stolen about individual consum-
ers is sometimes used for identity 
theft. Harms to social institutions 
also occur. The social security sys-
tem, for example, has been threat-
ened in part due to rampant social 
security number vulnerability.2 
Similarly, the integrity of social 
structures, such as law enforce-
ment and the criminal justice 
system, is negatively affected by 
information crime. For instance, 
identity thieves sometimes identi-
fy themselves using a victim’s per-
sonal information when charged 
with a crime. 
The proper calculus with re-
spect to information security ad-
equacy should turn on the simple 
ethical question: “Have we veri-
fied that our products and op-
erations don’t cause avoidable 
harm to others?” This “duty not 
to harm” can be operationalized 
in information security practices 
in at least two ways. First, it in-
volves timely, fair, and accurate 
disclosure of the existence of se-
curity vulnerabilities that put 
consumers, business partners, and 
the social system at risk, thereby 
enabling these affected parties to 
mitigate their exposure to infor-
mation risk. Second, it involves 
due care in research and devel-
opment, as well as auditing and 
updating information security 
practices to stay in step with the 
state of the art. To date, neither 
of these practices are a universal 
norm of corporate conduct. Fur-
ther current legal regimes aren’t 
robust; the law is currently inad-
equate to enforce this duty not to 
harm.3 An impactful information 
gap exists, which vulnerability re-
searchers help to close. Without 
this intermediation, it’s unlikely 
that meaningful improvements in 
information security will occur in 
a timely manner. Meanwhile, the 
consequences of widespread vul-
nerability carry heavy social costs.
Vulnerability Research: 
Neither Unethical  
nor Illegal 
Increasingly, ethics scholars are 
recognizing the existence of core 
ethics standards that apply to all 
commercial activities. They point 
to factors such as acting honestly 
and in good faith, warn against 
conflicts of interest, require the ex-
ercise of due care, and emphasize 
fairness and just results. (In “Con-
fronting Morality in Markets,” 
Thomas Dunfee and N.E. Bowie 
argue that morality is expressed 
within markets and could result 
in pressures on organizations to 
respond.4) Perhaps the most basic 
of benign moral concerns in ethics 
is the duty to avoid knowingly or 
recklessly harming others—that is, 
the “duty not to harm.” 
Some critics of vulnerabil-
ity research assert that it’s in-
herently unethical, presumably 
because it involves testing sys-
tems and analyzing products cre-
ated and maintained by someone 
other than the researcher (http://
searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
magazineFeature/0,296894,sid14 
_gci1313268,00.html). If we ap-
ply the ethics principle of the duty 
not to harm, however, a strong 
argument exists that at least a 
portion of vulnerability research 
is ethical and, in fact, ethically 
desirable. Provided that vulner-
ability research is technologically 
nondisruptive, doesn’t damage 
Increasingly, ethics scholars are recognizing the  




the functionality of the products 
and systems it tests or otherwise 
harm third parties, the ethi-
cal duty not to harm appears to 
be met. Additionally, with some 
vulnerability research, its goal is 
explicitly to prevent or mitigate 
harm occurring to third parties 
because of vulnerable products 
and operations whose creator has 
failed to disclose the danger. As 
such, we can argue that the ethi-
cal duty not to harm might even 
mandate vulnerability research in 
some cases: the community of re-
searchers possessing special skills 
to protect society from vulner-
able products could have a moral 
obligation to use these skills not 
only for personal gain but also for 
the benefit of society as a whole. 
(For some ethicists, corporations 
might have ethical obligations to 
exercise unique competencies for 
societal good.5) 
Perhaps the most superficially 
potent objections vulnerability re-
search skeptics have raised involve 
the law. First, critics assert that vul-
nerability research is unnecessary 
and, second, that all such research 
is, by definition, “illegal” because 
it violates state and federal com-
puter intrusion statutes or intellec-
tual property rights. On the point 
of vulnerability research being su-
perfluous, critics state that acting 
responsibly for a business entity in 
the area of information security 
simply means complying with the 
law and that the law defines what 
constitutes good business practic-
es. This objection fundamentally 
misunderstands the relationship 
between responsible corporate 
conduct and legal regulation. Law 
is merely a floor of conduct, not 
a marker of best practices or ethi-
cal conduct. Leading ethicists have 
explicitly rejected the idea that 
law and business ethics necessarily 
converge.6 Furthermore, although 
both US and international regula-
tors are beginning to take action in 
the realm of information security 
regulation, legally speaking, the 
field is still in its infancy. To date, 
the information security legal re-
gime adopted in the US to address 
issues of vulnerability is an imper-
fect patchwork of state and fed-
eral laws, widely critiqued in legal 
scholarship;7 it’s also barely a de-
cade old, doctrinally inconsistent, 
and in a state of flux.3 A need for 
timely, fair, and accurate disclo-
sure of the existence of informa-
tion security problems arises from 
the ethical duty not to harm, re-
gardless of the state of the law. By 
the time disclosure is legally man-
dated, irreparable harm has usually 
occurred. In fact, we can view the 
law as creating negative incentives 
for correcting security vulner-
abilities: because contract law has 
allowed technology producers to 
disclaim essentially all liability as-
sociated with their products, there 
are limited financial incentives for 
these producers to disclose the ex-
istence of vulnerabilities and fix 
products promptly so as to avoid 
lawsuits. Vulnerability research 
fills an information void the law 
doesn’t adequately address.
Although it’s likely that a court 
would construe some forms of 
vulnerability research to be in vio-
lation of state or federal computer 
intrusion statutes, it’s equally like-
ly that some forms of this research 
would be deemed legally permis-
sible. Even intellectual property 
rights have recognized limits at 
which concerns of consumer harm 
exist. In fact, Congress has en-
couraged vulnerability research 
in certain instances—for example, 
in the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, Congress explicitly pro-
tects research designed to test the 
privacy-invading potential and 
security implications of particular 
digital rights management tech-
nology.8 Furthermore, the exact 
construction of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act, the leading 
federal computer intrusion statute, 
is a subject of much debate and 
dissention, even among federal ap-
pellate courts. (For example, crit-
ics have analyzed the 7th Circuit9 
and the 9th Circuit10 to stand in 
direct contradiction of each other 
with regard to whether an em-
ployee who accesses employer files 
and uses that information for his 
own purposes has committed a 
violation of the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act.) Its interpretation 
and meaning are far from clear. It’s 
not obvious, for example, which 
forms of vulnerability research are 
prohibited by law. In the absence 
of clear legal guidance, however, 
it’s essential that the commu-
nity of vulnerability researchers 
commence a dialogue on self-
regulation, best practices, and the 
boundaries of ethical conduct. 
Crafting Norms of 
Vulnerability Research 
Using a case study from research 
conducted at Columbia University, 
we propose several possible “best 
practices” in vulnerability research 
that we believe should be incorpo-
rated into a vulnerability research-
ers’ code of conduct. Research 
demonstrates that the existence of 
corporate codes of conduct on eth-
ical behavior are significantly relat-
ed to such behavior or to whether 
employees behave ethically.11 In 
particular, codes that clearly stip-
ulate standards for information 
security conduct and sanctions 
for data mishandling are likely to 
generate more ethical conduct.12 
Because inappropriately done vul-
nerability research can cause sig-
nificant harm to systems and the 
people who rely on them, this type 
of research should be undertaken 
with care. 
Our work at Columbia Uni-
versity looked at vulnerabilities 
in routers and other embedded 
networked devices as they are de-
ployed across the Internet rather 
than strictly confined to an iso-
lated laboratory. Such embedded 
networked devices have become a 
ubiquitous fixture in the modern 




ture. Devices like routers, NAS 
appliances, home entertainment 
appliances, Wi-Fi access points, 
webcams, voice-over-IP appli-
ances, print servers, and video 
conferencing units reside on the 
same networks as our personal 
computers and enterprise servers 
and together form our world-wide 
communication infrastructure. 
Widely deployed and often mis-
configured, they constitute highly 
attractive targets for exploitation.
We conducted a vulnerability 
assessment of embedded network 
devices within the world’s largest 
ISPs and civilian networks span-
ning North America, Europe, 
and Asia. Our goal was to identify 
the degree of vulnerability of the 
overall networking infrastructure 
and, having devised some poten-
tial defenses, to determine their 
practicality and feasibility as a re-
active defense. To give a sense of 
the problem’s scale, we provide 
some quantitative data. In our vul-
nerability assessment, we scanned 
486 million IP addresses, looking 
for a trivial vulnerability: embed-
ded systems with a default pass-
word setting to their telnet or Web 
server interface. Out of the 3 mil-
lion Web servers and 2.8 million 
telnet servers discovered, 102,896 
embedded devices were openly 
accessible with default adminis-
trative credentials (username and 
password). Some of these devices 
were routers or devices managing 
or controlling the connectivity of 
hundreds (or thousands) of other 
devices. Other unprotected de-
vices such as video conferencing 
units, IP telephony devices, and 
networked monitoring systems 
can be exploited to extract vast 
amounts of highly sensitive tex-
tual, audio, and visual data.
In trying to devise defenses for 
such devices, however, we’re forced 
to acknowledge and think about 
the ethical questions this technical 
reality raises: such devices consti-
tute “network plumbing,” which 
few people want to think about or 
spend much time tinkering with, 
except when it visibly fails. Even 
with the active support of router 
manufacturers, expecting that us-
ers would update their embedded 
systems (which aren’t as straightfor-
ward to update as the typical desk-
top or laptop operating system) isn’t 
an optimal strategy from the stand-
point of minimizing harm. In fact, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that 
publicizing the vulnerabilities we 
knew about in the form of a ven-
dor-approved or even vendor-sup-
plied software patch would likely 
cause more damage—such a move 
would attract the attention of pre-
viously unaware attackers and cre-
ate a sense of urgency in exploiting 
these vulnerabilities before they 
“disappear.” Reactive defenses, on 
the other hand, could sidestep these 
issues by hardening those systems 
without any action by the device 
owners, in response to a detected 
attack (whether against a specific 
device or the network as a whole).
However, this entire line of 
research raises a slew of ethical, 
moral, and even legal questions. 
Is our vulnerability assessment of 
the Internet (or a large fraction of 
it) ethical? Is our disclosure of the 
assessment and its results ethical? 
What of the contemplated defens-
es? Although proactively deploy-
ing our defenses without owners’ 
consent across the Internet would 
likely be viewed as unethical, 
there’s also a reasonable expecta-
tion that in the event of a major 
cybersecurity incident, an organi-
zation such as the US Department 
of Homeland Security would 
choose to employ such means to 
defend the critical infrastructure. 
Where, then, do qualified security 
professionals lie on this spectrum? 
What about someone who discov-
ers a weakness in such an attack 
and rapidly develops and deploys 
a countermeasure that uses the 
same attack vector to install itself 
on still-vulnerable systems? Crude 
attempts along these lines could be 
seen in the CodeRed/CodeGreen 
engagement and Li0n/Cheese 
worms in 2001, and the Santy/
anti-Santy Web worms in 2004.
Based on our experiences and 
discussions conducting this re-
search, we propose the following 
suggestions for best practices for 
ethical vulnerability research.
Disclose Intent  
and Research
As a first step, the research’s 
intent should be publicly an-
nounced, including details about 
the methods involved in acquir-
ing data or testing devices or 
products for vulnerabilities. Open 
 communication of this informa-
tion can be easily accomplished 
through a well-publicized Web 
site, such as Columbia University’s 
home router vulnerability assess-
ment Web page at www.hacktory.
cs.columbia.edu.
Seek Legal Counsel Prior 
to Starting Research
Active debate is under way in the 
courts and legal academic com-
munity regarding the appropriate 
construction of computer intrusion 
and intellectual property statutes, 
and researchers should consult ad-
vice of counsel prior to commenc-
ing a project whenever practicable. 
Possible sources of inexpensive le-
gal advice for researchers include 
intellectual property law clinics 
operated by law schools, univer-
sity general counsel, law firm pro 
bono initiatives, and nonprofit 
organizations concerned about is-
sues of civil liberty and consumer 
protection such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation.
Be Proactive  
about Data Protection 
At every stage of the research, 
the team must be informed about 
the nature and need to safeguard 
data. There are several important 
considerations.
• All members of the research 
team should receive, review, and 
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preferably sign a “best data prac-
tices policy” that states the rules 
of research conduct and infor-
mation handling that the princi-
pal investigator sets forth for the 
lab or project at hand. Because 
graduate students and other indi-
viduals working on the research 
team might be unfamiliar with 
the data collection, handling, 
and use practices the principal 
investigator expects, obtaining 
the entire team’s agreement on 
the rules of data protection for 
the project prior to starting will 
help prevent misunderstandings 
and careless errors. In the un-
likely event that a team member 
engages in unethical behavior, 
the existence of this policy dem-
onstrates that the unethical con-
duct was indeed a transgression, 
even if the conduct falls in an 
ethical “gray area.” 
• Access to any sensitive data used 
as part of or obtained during 
the research should be carefully 
safeguarded with limited access 
on a “need-to-know” basis only. 
Certainly, security practitioners 
must safeguard the customer’s 
confidential information about 
its own security posture. 
• Finally, data should be ano-
nymized to the greatest extent 
possible in accordance with cur-
rent capabilities.
Further Knowledge  
in the Field 
Basic research should further the 
state of knowledge in the field 
of information security. General 
results of a scientific or techni-
cal nature revealing the scale and 
scope of significant vulnerabilities 
should be widely published in the 
scientific literature; publications 
should reveal sufficient detail to 




Any significant findings of harm-
ful vulnerabilities should be re-
ported, directly or indirectly, to 
the people who can best correct 
the problems. The optimal chan-
nels for this disclosure are cur-
rently a matter of debate in both 
the legal and information secu-
rity community. At present, each 
principal investigator should as-
sess the unique facts and circum-
stances of the vulnerability and 
apply the duty not to harm. In 
other words, an ethical vulner-
ability researcher will determine 
which methods of notification are 
most likely to limit harm to third 
parties, in particular, users of the 
vulnerable product and those who 
rely on its use. In short, the goal 
of an ethical security researcher’s 
disclosure is always to minimize 
harm, to reinforce through con-
duct the goals of the research stat-
ed prior to commencement, and 
improve the overall state of infor-
mation security.
Prepare the  
Next Generation  
of Professionals and 
Researchers 
To better train the next genera-
tion of security professional and 
researchers to combat informa-
tion security harms, the com-
puter science curriculum should 
include penetration testing and 
real-world exploitation tech-
niques. Building and auditing 
systems effectively to minimize 
harm requires knowledge par-
ity in practical skills between 
malicious actors and the security 
champions who seek to protect 
innocent third parties. 
T he technical considerations of any security professional’s basic 
training are quite challenging. The 
practice of security professionals is 
perhaps far more complex when 
we consider the moral and ethical 
challenges that confront each of 
us when we apply our knowledge 
and skills to protect the systems on 
which we depend. 
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